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Abstract   Time-diary data from 27 countries show a negative relationship between GDP per 
capita and gender differences in total work—for pay and at home.  In rich non-Catholic countries 
men and women average about the same amount of total work. Survey results show scholars and 
the general public believe that women work more. Widespread average equality does not arise 
from gender differences in the price of time, intra-family bargaining or spousal complementarity. 
Several theories, including ones based on social norms, might explain these findings and are 
consistent with evidence from the World Values Surveys and microeconomic data from Australia 
and Germany. 
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1 Introduction 
Men engage in more market work than women.  What has not been thoroughly examined, and 
indeed has been almost ignored by economists, is gender differences in the total amount of 
work—the sum of work in the market and at home.  Despite the obvious importance of looking 
more closely at how people spend their non-work time, relatively little attention has been paid to 
describing its patterns and examining its determinants.  A few studies have considered how the 
price of time affects the distribution of non-work time (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1990; Kalenkoski 
et al, 2009); and Freeman and Schettkat (2005) have examined possible trade-offs between 
market and non-market work in a few countries.  This line of inquiry has been limited by the 
relative paucity of available data sets.  This absence of data has begun to change, and that change 
enables us to examine gender differences in the allocation of total work time. 
The issue of gender differences in time use is important for a number of reasons. First, 
because the amount of work (and thus the utility from leisure) is one of the crucial arguing points 
in the “gender wars,” simply discovering new facts about it is important.  Second, the 
determinants of those facts allow inferring how patterns of work by gender change as economies 
develop.  Third, by generating new explanations for patterns of gender differences in the amount 
of total work, we may provide an impetus for using similar theories to examine other differences 
in the allocation of time.  Finally, these facts and the related theoretical discussion impose 
restrictions on a variety of economic models. 
Our purposes here are to document in much greater detail a fact that has been essentially 
ignored by economists and that appears unknown to the public, and to offer and test some 
explanations for it. In the next section we describe what we mean by market and household work 
and examine the gender breakdown of work at home and in the market using time-diary data from 
27 countries.  Whether the facts that we adduce in Section 2 are novel, and whether they are 
already widely known, are examined in Section 3.  Section 4 considers some possible 
explanations of our findings and indicates which ones seem inconsistent with aggregate data.  
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Section 5 examines some micro-econometric evidence. The end result is a variety of facts and the 
ability to rule out some explanations for them. Section 6 indicates how these considerations might 
be used to inform how we model a variety of economic behavior. 
 
2 Gender Differences in Market and Home Work  
In order to examine gender differences in work we need to devise general rules that allow 
activities to be classified as work.  We follow standard practice, defining market work as time 
spent for pay (or in unpaid household production for the market). We assume people would not 
be working the marginal hour in the market if they were not paid. In the economics literature 
market work has generally been treated as the complement of the aggregate of all activities 
outside the market—implicitly all uses of non-market time have been assumed to be aggregable. 
 Household work includes those activities that satisfy the third-party rule (Reid, 1934) that 
substituting market goods and services for one’s own time is possible.  We define total work as 
the sum of time spent in market work and household production.  Note that we do not and cannot 
examine gender differences in the consumption value of the average or marginal minute of 
market or household production; all we do here is estimate, and then try to explain differences in 
the total amount of time spent in productive activities. 
             Throughout this initial empirical section we define the aggregates of activities as 
similarly as possible across the countries under study. Respondents in these studies are given a 
time-diary for one or more recent days and asked to account for all time during that day. The 
respondent either works from a set of codes indicating specific activities, or the survey team 
codes the descriptions into a pre-determined set of categories. 
Time diaries have the virtue of forcing respondents to report a time allocation that adds to 
24 hours in a day. Also, unlike retrospective data about last year’s or even last week’s work time, 
while the time-diary information is necessarily based on recall, the recall period is only one day.  
The shorter recall period and the implicit time-budget constraint suggest that information on 
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market work from time diaries is likely to be more reliable than the recall data on time use from 
standard household surveys. Most crucially, time diaries provide information on non-market 
activities that is generally unavailable in labor-force surveys. 
The aggregates from Australia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States 
and Israel used here represent our own calculations from micro data.  We added aggregations 
based on published summaries of recent time-diary studies from seven wealthy EU countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Norway) and three 
transition countries (Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia) from Aliaga and Winqvist (2003); from 
various published summaries describing the results of time-diary studies conducted since 1992 in 
Canada, Ireland, Japan and New Zealand, and Benin, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa 
(from Blackden and Wooden, 2006), and from Mexico and Turkey.1    
Definitions of total work are shown in the Appendix. Obviously they are not identical 
across countries—but they are identical across gender within country.  We cannot prove the 
absence of a systematic bias in the aggregations of results in each diary toward counting as work 
activities those performed especially by one gender or the other; but for our cross-country results 
to be biased would require systematic errors that are the same in most countries’ methods of 
categorizing work activities. 
Among the 27 countries women’s (unweighted) average total work is 446.4 minutes per 
day (s.e. = 8.6), men’s is 421.7 minutes (s.e. = 8.9).  Women’s total work significantly exceeds 
men’s in this sample, albeit not by a huge amount. If we restrict the sample to the 14 wealthy 
non-Catholic countries (2002 real GDP/capita above $15,000, from Heston et al 2006), the 
averages are 440.1 (s.e. = 7.4) and 431.4 (s.e. = 7.5) respectively, a statistically insignificant 
                                                 
1While a few of the underlying micro data sets are available, most are not, thus necessitating our reliance 
on published sub-aggregates in constructing the aggregates of total work. These countries represent the 
entire set for which we could find appropriate data. 
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gender difference in total work.2  We refer to this striking outcome henceforth as the iso-work 
phenomenon. This finding implies that there also is gender equality in the total of non-work time 
consumed in rich nations that lack a Catholic cultural background. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The scatter diagram in Figure 1 compares men’s and women’s total work in the 27 
countries.  The steepest line shows what women’s total work would be if it were identical to 
men’s.  A regression relating women’s to men’s total work and including an indicator for 
religious background (equaling one in six countries) yields:  
FemaleTotalWork = 134.05 + 0.73MaleTotalWork +17.72Catholic , N=27, Adj. R2 = 0.590 . 
                                  (51.54)  (0.12)                   (13.36)  
(The regression line through the non-Catholic points is the lower of the two parallel lines in 
Figure 1.) We reject the hypotheses that the intercept is zero and that the slope on 
MaleTotalWork is one, as well as the joint hypothesis.3  Nonetheless, the slope of the relationship 
between total work by gender is economically not that much different from one, and the averages 
for rich non-Catholic countries do not differ statistically or economically. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 Figure 2 shows a scatter of the difference in average minutes per day of female over male 
total work time and real GDP/capita and a line fitting these points.  It suggests either that 
economic development is highly positively correlated with gender equality of total work or that 
today’s rich non-Catholic countries have always had a different culture along this dimension.  
Furthermore, the relationship appears to be nonlinear, with gender equality being approached or 
even reached at a sufficiently high level of personal income.   
Based on these results we cannot claim that gender equality in total work holds at all 
times and places. It does not hold in middle- or lower-income countries today or in predominantly 
                                                 
2We classify Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Ireland and Mexico as Catholic countries, as they are the only 
ones with large, at least nominally Catholic majorities. 
  
3The statistic testing the joint hypothesis is F(2,24) = 8.18, p=.002.  
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Catholic countries.  Perhaps if more data were available on still other countries, the conclusion 
might change; but based on all the available evidence the results suggest strongly that iso-work 
characterizes average household behavior and labor markets in rich non-Catholic countries.  
Moreover, the cross-section evidence suggests that iso-work is approached as real incomes rise.  
 
3 Novelty and Knowledge 
The iso-work fact has been hinted at by several sociologists.  Robinson and Godbey (1999) show 
that it describes the average of (recall and time-diary) data from 14 countries from the 1980s and 
early 1990s; and Gershuny (2000) shows that it roughly characterizes the two averages over a 
similar but still smaller sample of data sets covering the 1960s through the mid-1990s. No study 
has demonstrated it using data sets that were as well-harmonized as those that we used here, nor 
has one shown how closely it describes average outcomes in individual countries.  
While iso-work is not new to the sociology literature, it appears not to have been studied 
by economists.  The difficulty, however, is that it has been swamped by claims in widely 
circulated ethnographic studies (Hochschild, 1997, and earlier work) based on a few households 
that women’s total work significantly exceeds men’s.  Indeed, even sociologists who 
demonstrated it (e.g., Mattingly and Bianchi, 2003, for the United States, and Bittman and 
Wajcman, 2000, for several countries), downplayed it to focus on claims that women’s work is 
more onerous than men’s and that women’s leisure provides less pleasure.  
 Whether the possibility of iso-work is well known among economists, other social 
scientists and the general public is unclear.  To examine this issue, we designed a survey that 
asked the following question:   
“We know that American men (ages 20-75) on average work more in the market 
than do American women.  But what is the difference between men's TOTAL 
WORK (in the market and on anything that you might view as work at home) 
and that of women? Without consulting any books, articles or raw data, PLEASE 
PUT AN X NEXT TO THE LINE BELOW THAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE 
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CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE 
US.”   
Respondents were allowed nine possible responses, ranging from a 25 percent excess of female 
total work, to symmetry around equality, to a 25 percent excess of male total work. 
In August 2006 we emailed this survey to three groups:  1) 663 labor economists 
affiliated with a worldwide network of such researchers.  The survey distinguished respondents 
who had spent at least six months in the U.S. from those who had not;  2) 255 elite macro and 
public finance economists, members of a mostly American network of such researchers; and 3) 
210 faculty members and graduate students in a leading American sociology department.  The 
first and third groups received follow-up emails three weeks after the initial survey.  Also, early 
in September 2006 we asked the same question of 533 students in an introductory 
microeconomics class.  Using the information on location in the first group, we thus have five 
separate sets of responses. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 The results are shown in Table 1, with the categories ≥10 percent or ≤-10 percent 
combined for presentational ease. The majority of respondents in each group believe that 
American women perform at least five percent more total work than men.  Assigning half the 
respondents who state that there is equality to this category, in all samples we easily reject the 
null hypothesis that the proportions stating that men work less or women work less are equal.4    
 Despite the apparent gender equality of total work in most rich countries, all groups 
considered were unaware of this. It may be the case that most people are in fact aware of the 
underlying differences while our samples are simply unrepresentative; and, as is always true with 
eliciting information about beliefs, perhaps the respondents to our surveys were thinking about 
something other than the sheer quantity of work—perhaps how onerous it is.  Nonetheless, this 
                                                 
4Even if we were to assign all those stating that there is equality to the “men work more” group, this null 
hypothesis would still be rejected in some of the samples.  
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evidence suggests as strongly as survey evidence on subjective beliefs can that people believe 
women’s total work exceeds men’s in rich countries. 
 
4 Explaining the Phenomenon: Which Theories Can or Cannot? 
4.1 Market-based Forces  
 Assuming iso-work is a fair description of behavior in many rich countries, it is natural to 
try to explain it as the outcome of market forces that differ across countries but present women 
and men within each country with similar economic choices. This is a difficult task. To start, 
economic theory would predict iso-work as a market outcome if men and women: 1) had the 
same preferences over work and leisure – or at least could be approximated by the same 
representative agent; 2) faced the same market wage, net of taxes and other costs of participation, 
and 3) had identical productivity in home production. To deviate from this set of implausible 
symmetry conditions and still obtain iso-work as an equilibrium outcome, additional restrictions 
on preferences, prices and endowments are necessary. For example, if goods produced at home 
are perfect substitutes for market goods, and the representative man and woman have identical 
Cobb-Douglas preferences over leisure (and no differential disutility from hours supplied in either 
type of work), then the combined supply of hours to market and home production is constant and 
identical across gender. Because these assumptions are hardly more plausible than the symmetric 
and symmetric-and-equal assumptions, iso-work as a market outcome seems more likely a 
coincidence than a central tendency across economies robustly predicted by theory.  
The task becomes even more difficult when we try to explain deviations from iso-work in 
developing countries and their tendency to disappear as economies develop.  Assuming 
substitution effects dominate income effects, economic theory predicts that a rise in women’s 
relative wage (i.e. a decline in the gender wage gap) will lead to more work in the market by 
women relative to men. The impact of this increase on the relative amount of home work should 
be in the opposite direction, so that the effect of a change in the gender gap on the relative 
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amounts of total work is ambiguous.  Unless, however, additional market work is offset one-for-
one by reduced home work, a rise in the female relative wage should raise women’s relative total 
work. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 To examine this possibility, we use estimates of the difference between the logarithms of 
the medians of the distributions of males’ and females’ wages produced by Polachek and Xiang 
(2009) for 19 of the 27 countries used here.  The first two columns in Table 2 present least-
squares estimates of equations describing female-male differences in market and total work 
across countries as functions of the gender wage gap. The results on market work are consistent 
with an upward-sloping relative supply curve of labor.  The market work effect, however, 
dominates the household work effect, so that we find that the female-male gap in total work is 
also positively related to the female-male wage ratio. 
These findings are not affected by the inclusion of real GDP per capita, as the estimates 
in Columns (3) and (4) show, nor are they affected by adding the indicator for Catholic countries.   
That the GDP variable is only marginally statistically significant, whereas Figure 2 suggested a 
strong negative relationship with a diminishing slope, arises from the exclusion of many of the 
poorer countries (for which relative wage data are unavailable).  Despite the quality of the 
estimates, the equation in Column (6) describes below half of the variance in the gender 
difference in total work across countries.  The difficulty is that in 14 of these 19 countries these 
differences are clustered within five percent of equality, while the gender wage gaps in these data 
range from 0.07 to 0.69.  Something besides equality in relative wages or differences in per-capita 
incomes is causing the pervasive absence of gender differences in total work. 
4.2 Bargaining, Matching and Imitation Within Couples  
A different perspective on iso-work arises from the literature on household behavior (e.g., 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). In this view, the gender wage gap reflects differences in bargaining 
power in the household, as it would be regardless of whether one views spouses’ behavior as 
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described by a unitary or a collective model.  By this criterion, we should expect to observe men 
working relatively less in total when female-male relative pay is lower, if preferences over leisure 
are normal.5  The estimates in Table 2 imply the opposite result.  Where one might infer that men 
have more bargaining power, as measured by relative wages, their total work is in fact greater. 
A second possible explanation for some of these facts is that husbands and wives pay 
attention to each other’s labor and leisure, and gender equality obtains at the means in rich 
countries because most adult men and women are married.  An explicit test of the notion that 
gender iso-work is generated by husbands and wives focusing on each other’s work effort as part 
of marriage comes from examining inter-household dispersion in the within-household gender 
total work gap using data on couples.  This examination is not possible for the U.S. in 2003, so 
instead we use the much smaller 1985 U.S. Time Use Survey.  We use averages over three days 
from the 2001/02 German data and over two days from the 1992 Australian survey. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Figures 3-5 show frequency distributions of within-household differences between the 
average daily total work of wives and husbands in the U.S., Australia and Germany.  While the 
distributions are symmetric around means of zero, the implied dispersion is large. Regressions 
within each country of the wife’s total work time on the husband’s explain only 9 percent of the 
variation in the U.S., 29 percent of the variation in Australia and 35 percent in Germany. We do 
find evidence of complementarity of spouses’ total work (and thus of leisure), but most of the 
                                                 
5Consider a large class of models in which spouses derive utility from consumption, which is public and 
joint to the couple, and separable in leisure, which is the time-budget complement of total work time. The 
couple must produce a fixed amount of public consumption at home using a constant returns production 
function of each household member’s time, without prejudice to the relative efficiency of the man or 
woman. Assume that the joint family decision is to maximize a weighted sum of utilities of the two 
household members. The solution to this two-stage problem is a labor supply rule which implies iso-work if 
and only if each utility weight equals the percentage deviation of the respective gender wage from its 
average. Thus the greater the excess of male over female wages, the lower men’s total work relative to 
women’s. See for example Knowles (2010).  
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dispersion in intra-household differences in total work remains.6 This evidence is inconsistent 
with the assertion that the iso-work phenomenon stems from the alignment of behavior within a 
couple, perhaps not surprising given Cigno’s (2009) demonstration that iso-work could result 
from non-cooperative equilibria, which are less likely within marriage.7  
4.3 Social Norms 
Another possible coordination device that we explore here is a social norm for leisure 
that generates a form of interdependent utility among agents and serves as a focal point for the 
determination of total work. Social norms have been increasingly incorporated into economic 
models, and they provide important additional insights and modifications into how we view 
markets as operating (see Fernández, 2010, for a discussion). In our context, peer pressure leading 
to a desire to conform to a common social norm for time allocation mutes market incentives and 
weakens the impact of individual tastes. As a result, time use becomes more similar across 
individuals.8  If the social norm is strong enough to drive agents to conform fully, we obtain the 
iso-work result suggested by the data.9 
While there are many variations on the theme, models of social norms have the following 
common feature. Absent a social norm, consumers maximize utility given a standard budget 
constraint. Common behavior – as an average of that of members of a given and possibly 
endogenously determined group – conditions utility, so equilibrium enforces consistency of the 
individual’s maximizing behavior with the group outcome. Deviations from the norm are costly.  
                                                 
6See Hamermesh (2002) for evidence of the importance of both the quantitative and timing aspects of 
complementarity of spouses’ market work. 
 
7By extension, it is also inconsistent with a model of matching and search in which total hours worked are 
chosen to increase the chances of a successful match.  
 
8Social norms have been studied, among many others, by Akerlof (1980), Lindbeck et al. (1999) and 
Kooreman (2007). 
 
9In this simple story, total conformity only occurs if the desire to conform is infinitely strong. The literature 
on conformity (e.g. Bernheim, 1994) has sought ways to obtain identical behavior without assuming an 
infinite cost of deviation. 
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A simple model of social norms is not sufficient to rationalize our observations. The 
empirical difficulty is that iso-work coexists with significant within-gender (and more generally 
within-group) heterogeneity of leisure. This is inconsistent with a simple single-norm account, 
because, as the penalty for deviating increases, the labor supply of each individual converges to a 
common, gender-neutral norm regardless of the wage.10 While a strong norm bridges the gap 
between male and female leisure, it also suppresses any within-gender heterogeneity of leisure, 
which is a central feature of the data. 
One way to avoid this feature is to allow multiple local social norms, unrelated to 
gender.11 Suppose each gender is stratified into social clusters that are defined by relative position 
in the wage distribution. For instance, males and females above their gender’s median wage may 
share a common leisure norm, and there is another leisure norm below the median wage. Agents 
could just as well be clustered according to the color of their eyes, the month in which they are 
born, or the neighborhood where they live. The crucial assumption is that the clusters are defined 
by gender-neutral characteristics.12 In such models the greater the number of clusters or 
interacting groups, the more likely that iso-work can obtain.    
The findings presented in Section 2 make it clear that total work does vary across 
countries, region and over time. Since one might rationalize iso-work by social norms by arguing 
that they serve as a coordination device between male and female total work, we must also 
explain how norms can vary. This is most simply done by endogenizing the norm.  
A social norm theory of leisure can produce the negative relation between female-male 
differences in total work and GDP per capita in various ways. The first relies on the link between 
                                                 
10This is also true if the sensitivity of leisure to gender wage differences differs by gender. 
 
11 For a detailed and formal exposition of this point, see Burda et al (2007).  
 
12By contrast, social leisure norms defined in terms of the position of the wage above or below some 
arbitrary levels (i.e., a leisure norm for “high” wage males and females, another one for “low” wage ones) 
will in general be gender-biased, as the proportions of males and females adopting a given norm will differ 
unless the separating levels happen to coincide with median wages.  
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economic development and increased gender neutrality of social reference groups. A model of 
social clusters can account for the reduction in the female-male total work difference as GDP per 
capita grows, provided economic growth is positively correlated with the adoption of gender-
neutral reference groups. Suppose that at low income levels there are two leisure reference 
groups: one for men, and one for women. This might be due to tastes for discrimination, for 
example, which are correlated with income level. Then, trivially, iso-work does not hold. If 
gender-oriented social clusters are replaced by gender-neutral reference groups as income rises 
(e.g., at quantiles of income distributions), development will be associated with convergence of 
the total work difference. 
A second variant assumes that the cost of deviating from a social norm is positively 
related to the wage. Consider the simple one-norm model when people are harassed for deviating 
from the norm. Perhaps instead of suffering the direct utility loss envisaged above, deviants lose 
time fending off their critics, mending their reputations, or battling inner guilt feelings at the cost 
of time available for work or leisure. At a low wage or level of development, the weight on the 
norm is low, so that the intrinsic optimum is the main determinant of leisure. At a high wage or 
development level, the social norm becomes the sole determinant of optimal leisure. As the 
wage—the value of time—increases, so does the cost of deviating from the norm, resulting in a 
smaller deviation. 
A final possibility is that there is a social stigma attached to female participation in 
market activities. Goldin (1995) assumes that blue-collar, but not white-collar work by a woman 
entails a fixed utility loss. Imagine a simpler scenario in which any positive female market 
activity is stigmatized, and there is no social norm beyond this stigma. If a woman works in the 
market, her utility is diminished by a fixed penalty associated with the stigma, while conformity 
to stereotyped behavior yields positive additional utility. Staying home is optimal as long as the 
13 
 
utility differential exceeds the valuation of market participation.13 Development and the 
concomitant rise in wages reduce the impact of gender stereotypes on behavior. In that respect, 
development makes men and women behave, ceteris paribus, in increasingly similar ways.14 
 
5 Exploring Social Norms as an Explanation of Iso-work 
An explanation based on social norms is difficult to test directly but does provide some guidelines 
for considering the data.  Any test based on arbitrary sub-groups in which the gender ratio differs 
is excluded by the theory.  Conditioning on outcomes (e.g., examining differences by gender 
among paid workers) both violates the orthogonality condition and confounds effect with cause. 
We can, however, perform several indirect tests of the consistency of social norms with observed 
behavior.  None of these can validate the role of social norms to the exclusion of other 
explanations; but each offers a chance to examine whether social norms are inconsistent with the 
facts presented here.  
Insert Figure 6 about here 
One way to examine this is to infer whether differences in attitudes about gender roles are 
related to international gender differences in total work.  Respondents in the World Values 
Surveys (WVS) were asked whether they agreed with the statement, “When jobs are scarce, men 
should have more right to a job than women.” We see this question as indicating that the society 
views treating men and women differently as being socially acceptable. Figure 6 presents a 
scatter diagram relating averages of these data for the most recent year before the time-diary 
                                                 
13An alternative justification for the correlation between the strength of social norms and GDP can be 
inferred from experimental work conducted in rural Africa (Ensminger, 2004). One reason for the strength 
of this correlation may be that the physical demands of market work during the early stages of 
industrialization penalize women so that they must work more hours in order to supply the same productive 
effort as men. 
 
14Of course, it might be that men exaggerate the amount of home production that they undertake in richer 
countries, or that women exaggerate the amount of market work that they do.  Given the structure of how 
time diaries are collected, these seem unlikely. Moreover, additional regressions on the 27 countries 
depicted in Figure 1 show absolutely no relationship between male home production and real GDP, or 
female market work and real GDP. 
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survey to the female-male difference in total work for the 21 of the 27 countries used in Figure 1 
for which they are available. The scatter and the highly significant relationship between the 
gender total work difference and this attitudinal variable suggest that, where the expressed norm 
about the labor market favors men, women perform a greater share of total work.15 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
One might argue that this diagram merely reflects generalized cultural differences.  To 
examine this possibility we use a general measure of attitudes toward work in the WVS: the 
fraction of respondents agreeing that it would be unfortunate if there were less emphasis on work 
in the future.  The scatter of this variable and the gender difference in total work by country is 
shown in Figure 7, along with the regression relating the two.  The fit is much worse than in 
Figure 6.  Taking this argument one step further, we obtained an attitudinal measure from the 
WVS that is unrelated to attitudes about work—the fraction of respondents stating that they are 
very proud of their nationality.16  The scatter and regression of this variable and the gender 
difference in total work in Figure 8 show no relation between the two.17  With no claim of 
causation, the exercise does at least suggest a link between differences in total work and specific 
attitudes about gender roles in work. 
Evidence on norms in this context can be gleaned from the behavior of immigrants from 
nearly the same set of countries for which behavior is depicted in Figures 6-8 (see Fernández, 
                                                 
15We also experimented by holding constant for average educational attainment in each country.  While its 
inclusion did reduce the significance of the equation depicted in Figure 6, the estimated effect was still 
(barely) statistically significant.  Educational attainment is affected by the same cultural forces that 
determine these attitudes, so that its inclusion in the estimates may be incorrect.    
16All the data can be downloaded from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/.  The second and third 
questions on values are: 1) “Please tell me, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good 
thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind:  Less importance placed on work in our lives.”  2) “How proud are 
you to be [Nationality]?” 
 
17If we replace national averages of attitudes in each of these scatters with gender-specific national 
averages the results are hardly unchanged, as the correlations of averages of female and male attitudes in 
each case exceed 0.9. 
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2007). To examine this we calculate total work time using diaries from the American Time Use 
Survey 2003-2006.  We identified immigrants from 26 countries for which the WVS included 
responses to the questions used in Figures 6-8.  We then regressed average total work time on a 
number of demographic controls, separately for men and women.  If the social norm hypothesis is 
not incorrect, male immigrants from those countries where people believe that men should have 
priorities on jobs will work less in total than other immigrants, other things equal, while women 
from those countries will work more.  At the very least, the difference in the effect of this 
attitudinal measure between men and women will be negative.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
The results of this estimation are shown in the first two columns of Table 3. All of the 
vectors of demographic variables are significant (and ignoring them does not change the 
estimates of the impact of the attitudinal variable on total work time).  The crucial variable is not 
significantly different from zero,  The effects are, however, of opposite sign—negative for men, 
positive for women, as expected; and the difference between the effects, shown in the bottom row 
of the Table, is significant at the 95 percent level in a one-sided test. 
The impact of attitudes about gender roles on immigrants’ work time is not small.  The 
Table also shows the range of average responses on this question in the sending countries.  Using 
this range and the difference in the impact of this measure on work times by gender, the effect of 
going from the least to the most “sexist” sending country is 97 minutes—21 percent of the 
average total work time in this group. 
The remaining two pairs of columns in Table 3 present the same specifications but with 
the other attitudinal variables substituted sequentially for attitudes about gender work roles. The 
differences between the effects of the attitudinal variables on total work time differences by 
gender are much smaller and not statistically significant.  (Indeed, the impact of concerns about 
the future of work is more positive among men than among women.) These results demonstrate 
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that the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) are specifically related to attitudes about the gender and 
work, not to general differences in attitudes among the sending countries.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
A second microeconometric examination of the possible role of social norms in affecting 
differences in work times by gender uses the data on couples in Australia and Germany that 
underlie Figures 3-5.  (The 1985 U.S. data have too few observations to allow forming reliable 
group averages that might reflect peers’ behavior.) For each couple (3080 in Germany, 1966 in 
Australia), we initially regress wife’s total work on husband’s, with the results shown in Columns 
(1) and (5) of Table 4.  Following a now-substantial literature on the role of peer effects in 
behavior (see Borjas, 1992, for an early example), in Columns (2) and (6) we add to these 
variables measuring the average work of wives in the particular wife’s education group (four in 
Germany; three in Australia), age group (<40, 40-54, 55+) and region (West and East in 
Germany; New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and other jurisdictions in Australia).  
Columns (3) and (7) add controls for the wife’s own demographic and family characteristics. In 
both countries the addition of these peer outcomes improves the ability of the equations to 
describe the wife’s total work conditional on her husband’s.  Except for age for Germany in 
Column (3), peer outcomes of similarly-situated wives have significant impacts on the total work 
of individual wives.    
One might argue that these results merely reflect Manski’s (1995) reflection problem.  
We cannot demonstrate causation conclusively, but indirect evidence suggests that our results do 
not arise solely from the reflection of one’s own behavior.  One solution partitions the German 
and Australian samples into halves, calculates peer averages for one half-sample and includes 
them in regressions like those in Columns (3) and (6) based only on the other half-sample.  The 
results of re-estimating the equations on the second half-samples differ little from those shown in 
the Table. These similar results cannot be based on reflections, as the half-samples are different.   
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Individuals in the half-samples may, however, be responding to their own unmeasured 
common characteristics rather than to the behavior of their peers.  There is no way of 
circumventing this potential difficulty completely, just as in the larger peer-effects literature 
extricating common effects from responses to peers’ outcomes is exceedingly difficult.  In the 
case of Germany, however, we can probe a bit further by including in the regressions describing 
wives in 2001/02 peer outcomes based on wives included in a nearly identical survey in 1991/92. 
Those results are presented in Column (4) of Table 4 and should be compared to the results in 
Column (2).  While the impact of wives’ peers’ education is attenuated when we include lagged 
values, the impacts of peer outcomes in the same age group and region, although weaker, are still 
highly significant statistically.  
 
6 Conclusion: Implications for Economic Modeling 
 
We have presented evidence suggesting that men’s and women’s total work in a large group of 
rich countries does not differ significantly and have dubbed this apparent phenomenon “iso-
work.”  This phenomenon has been hinted at but glossed over by a few sociologists but does not 
appear to have entered into the conventional wisdom held by economists, sociologists or the 
public.  It could be important for modeling in a variety of areas of economics, and we have 
attempted to explore one of the many potential explanations for it, namely the idea of social 
norms.  Whether that explanation is the best one is unclear; but the difficulty accounting for the 
results with conventional, neoclassical economic theory is suggestive of the value of models with 
social interactions.  Our exploration sheds light on what might be required to explain the apparent 
iso-work phenomenon. 
 The first implication of our findings and attempts at explanation is linked to economic 
development. Our evidence documents convergence of total work across gender with GDP per 
capita. We show in Section 4 that this convergence can derive either from increasingly gender-
blind assignment to reference clusters with strong norms, or from a convergence of gender wage-
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offer distributions to a common one. The past half century has also seen secular, albeit slow 
convergence in gender wage differentials. These two phenomena are probably related, but what is 
their source? Has technical change augmented female market production relative to that of men?  
Is technical change in home production generally labor-saving (see Greenwood et al, 2005)?  
How have interactions of these two types of innovation combined to generate convergence in 
total work and the returns to market work?  Examining these interactions without considering 
gender roles (e.g., Ngai and Pissarides, 2008) is a useful step; but given the significant differences 
in gender roles in less developed countries, understanding growth and development requires 
accounting better for the convergence of total work and changes in the relative amounts of market 
and household work performed by men and women. This is especially true considering the 
different roles played by physical and intellectual attributes during economic development (Clark, 
1940). 
Second, household models typically assume that a spouse’s bargaining power is a 
function of her/his market earnings.  Yet we have shown here, at least for most rich economies, 
that gender differences in the amounts of non-work time are tiny.  How can this be true if, as is 
still the case, men have substantially higher wage rates and market earnings?  Three logical 
possibilities present themselves. Men have more power, but are altruistic toward their spouses 
and toward women generally, and do not take advantage of it.18 Another is that economists’ 
modeling of the household has been incorrect, and market earnings do not generate power in the 
household. A final alternative is that earnings do generate power, men are not altruistic, but the 
average man’s utility from his market and home work exceeds that of the average woman’s from 
the same total amount of work. This last possibility would formalize ideas of the few sociologists 
who have confronted the issue (e.g., Mattingly and Bianchi, 2003).  Yet this possibility shifts the 
discussion to why women find their work more onerous than men find theirs. Why, e.g., is the 
                                                 
18Doepke and Tertilt (2009) present a model in which self-interest motivated by inter-generational concerns 
leads men to use their power to grant equal rights to women.  Bertocchi (2011) constructs a model in which 
concerns by a changing median voter lead to extensions of rights to women. 
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marginal minute spent in an office dealing with recalcitrant colleagues and supervisors more 
pleasurable than the marginal minute spent baking a cake? 
 Our results suggest the potential importance of going beyond standard neoclassical 
models to analyze social phenomena.  Our inability to use neoclassical models to predict the 
patterns and correlates that we have demonstrated and their apparent consistency with some 
implications of some models of social norms suggest that this may be a fruitful approach to the 
study of labor markets generally.   
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Fig. 1 Female total work against male total work, 27 countriesa  
 
aNon-Catholic (upper parallel line), Catholic (lower parallel line), equality of total work (45º- line). The 
country abbreviations are listed in the Appendix.  
 
AUS92 
B98 
BEN99 CD98 DK01 
E98 
ES99 
F98 
FI9  
G01 
H00 
I02 
IE05 
IL92 
J01 
MAD01 
MAU03 
MX02 
N00 
NL00 
NZ98 
S00 
SA00 
SL00 
TR06 UK00 
US03 
350 
400 
450 
500 
550 
600 
350 400 450 500 550 
MaleTotalWork 
FemaleTotalWork Equality 
Catholic NonCatholic 
45º 
 
 
Fig. 2 Female - male total work and real GDP per capita, 27 countries 
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Fig. 3 Wife-husband difference in total work, United States 1985 
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Fig. 4 Wife-husband difference in average total work per day, Australia 1992 
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Fig. 5 Wife-husband difference in average total work per day, Germany 2001/02 
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Fig. 6 Gender total work difference and attitude to job scarcity, 21 countries 
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Fig. 7 Gender total work difference and attitude to value of market work, 21 countries 
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Fig. 8 Gender total work difference and pride in nationality, 21 countries 
 
DiffTotalWork = 19.24 + 10.22VeryProudNationality; Adj. R2 = -0.046 
                            (29.11)       
Table 1 Expert and other opinion about men’s and women’s total work 
 
 
Labor 
economists 
familiar 
with US 
Labor 
economists 
unfamiliar 
with US 
 
Elite macro 
and public 
finance 
economists 
Sociology 
faculty 
and 
graduate 
students 
 
 
Economics 
principles 
students 
Men work:        
At least 10% less  41.8 50.7 
 
44.8 
 
60.0 
 
43.6 
5% less  11.7 11.3 
 
10.5 
 
11.7 
 
12.8 
Differ by less than 2.5% 25.8 25.4 
 
 
34.2 
 
 
20.0 
 
 
23.1 
5% more  6.1 4.9 
 
3.9 
     
       1.7 
  
      9.2 
At least 10% more  14.6 7.7 
 
6.6 
 
6.6 
    
      11.3 
N =  213 142 
      
76 
 
60 
 
445 
      
t-statistic on binomial if 
“equal” answers are split 
evenly 5.47 6.73 
 
 
4.08 
 
 
6.08 
 
 
8.98 
       
RESPONSE RATE 0.535  0.298 0.286 0.873 
      
 
Responses to the question: “We know that American men (ages 20-75) on average work more in the market 
than do American women.  But what is the difference between men's TOTAL WORK (in the market and on 
anything that you might view as work at home) and that of women? Without consulting any books, articles 
or raw data, PLEASE PUT AN X NEXT TO THE LINE BELOW THAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE 
CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE US.” 
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Table 2 Impact of the gender pay gap on the gender total work (minutes per day)a 
 
 
Dep. Var.,    Female 
– Male Total Work: 
(1) 
 Market 
work 
(2) 
Total 
work 
(3)  
Market 
work 
(4) 
Total 
work 
(5)  
Market 
work 
(6) 
Total 
work 
Log (Female/Male 
Wage)b 
135.5 
 (73.02) 
44.0 
(38.54) 
182.8 
  (66.96) 
23.47 
(37.42) 
162.68 
 (71.71) 
55.00 
(32.34) 
Real GDP per capita 
($000)c    
4.38 
(1.78) 
-1.90 
(1.00) 
3.98 
(1.92) 
-1.20 
(0.87) 
Catholic    
  -17.22 
(26.07) 
33.78 
(11.76) 
Adj. R2 0.120 0.017 
 
0.321 
 
0.149 
 
0.293 
 
0.423 
N = 19       
 
aStandard errors in parentheses. 
 
bFrom Polachek and Xiang (2006). 
 
cFrom Heston et al (2006). 
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Table 3 Home-country social norms and immigrants’ total work time, American Time Use 
Survey, 2003-2006a  
                                      
       M        F    M       F                 M     F   
  
            (1)           (2)          (3)           (4)                    (5)          (6)  
       
Agree Men Should        -123.16     46.73     
  Have Job Priority       (81.23)   (70.46)       
 
Bad If Less Emphasis          54.44  -11.41      
  On Work                         (77.02)    (58.86)        
 
Very Proud of                    -26.01     -6.49   
    Nationality                         (59.22)   (44.34) 
 
Schooling: 
 12 years             38.67        -1.68        
              (29.21)     (23.02)        
 
 13-15 years             24.03      -19.61      
              (31.38)     (23.48)        
 
 16+ Years                64.32         9.41 
          (26.01)   (22.46)      
 
Age                      23.70         23.30       
                         (7.73)        (6.16)         
 
Age2/100              -30.20         26.21      
                      (9.61)          (7.86)        
 
Married                 59.65         26.46 
                       (22.27)       (17.75)      
 
Adj. R2            0.0435       0.0351              0.0412   0.0345             0.0408     0.0345 
 
N =   659     763     659        763     659     763  
 
Range of Attitudinal [0.125, 0.694]   [0.065, 0.719]   [0.138, 0.895] 
  Variable 
 
Difference in Effects       -169.89            65.85           -19.52 
 of Attitudinal Variables    (107.53)           (96.94)           (73.98) 
 
aRobust standard errors in parentheses beneath parameter estimates, standard error beneath the differences 
in effects of the attitudinal variables. Columns (3)-(6) include the same controls as in Columns (1) and (2). 
 
  
   
 
Table 4 Effects of social norms, married couples, Germany 2001/02, Australia 1992a 
 
Dep. Var.: 
 Wife’s Total Work 
             Germany             Australia 
 
           (1)         (2)         (3)        (4)                             (5)       (6)         (7)  
       
Husband’s          0.491     0.441    0.432    0.447        0.416    0.358     0.355 
  Total Work      (0.012)   (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)     (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)      
 
Total Work in Wife’s       
  Education Group         0.298    0.252   -0.404       0.466     0.587 
          (0.081)  (0.075) (0.231)         (0.111)  (0.129) 
 
  Age Group          0.281     0.055   0.216           0.431     0.231 
          (0.046)  (0.065) (0.033)         (0.056)  (0.070) 
 
  Region          0.722     0.873   0.443           1.276    1.668 
          (0.159)  (0.161) (0.098)         (0.518) (0.812) 
 
Norm Used        Current  Current  Lagged         Current  Current 
 
Wife’s Education,   Yes                Yes 
  Age 
 
Number and Ages   Yes                Yes 
 of Children 
  
Adj. R2         0.353      0.372     0.377   0.368       0.292     0.325    0.336 
 
N=      3080                      1966 
 
aStandard errors in parentheses. In Germany total work is averaged over three days, in Australia it is 
averaged over two days. For both countries the age groups are under 40, 40-54 and 55+.  There are four 
education groups in Germany, three in Australia.  Germany is divided into West and East, Australia into 
New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and other jurisdictions. 
DATA APPENDIX:  Definitions of Total Work in 27 Countries 
 
United States(US): Market work and work-related activities; travel related to work; all household 
activities; caring for and helping household members; consumer purchases; professional and 
personal care services; household services; government services; travel related to these. 
 
Australia(AUS):  Market work; cleaning and cooking; family and child care; shopping; and 
travel associated with each. 
 
Belgium(B), Denmark(DK), France(F), Finland(FI), Sweden(S), United Kingdom(UK), 
Estonia(ES), Hungary(H), Slovenia(SL) Norway(N):   Gainful work; study; household 
work + family care; proratio of travel time based on gainful work time. 
 
Benin(BEN), MadagascarMAD), Mauritius(MAU), South Africa(SA): Market work; 
domestic and care activities; commuting. 
 
Canada(CD):  “Total work” (paid work and related activities; unpaid work and related 
activities). 
 
Germany(G): Market work: employment and job search; home work activities; 
handicraft/gardening; care and sitting.  
 
Ireland(IE):  Care; employment and study; household work; proratio of travel time based on 
gainful work time. 
 
Israel(IL):  Market work; cooking and cleaning at home; child care. 
 
Italy(I):  market work; professional activities; training; domestic activities; family care; 
purchasing goods and services.  
 
Japan(J): Work, school work; house work, caring or nursing, child care, shopping. 
 
Mexico(MX):  Domestic work; care of children and other household members; market work. 
 
Netherlands(NL):   Occupational work and related travel; household work, do-it yourself, gardening, etc; 
childcare; shopping. 
 
New Zealand(NZ): Paid work; household work, care-giving for household members, purchasing 
goods or services, unpaid work for people outside the home. 
 
Spain(ES):  Market work; house work, child care, adult care. 
 
Turkey(TR):  Employment and job seeking; study; household and family care; proratio of travel 
time based on gainful work time. 
 
